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Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, by Norman Malcolm, edited 
with a response by Peter Winch. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1994. Pp. xi and 140. $30.50 (Cloth). 
RONALD E. HUSTWIT, The College of Wooster. 
This work of Norman Malcolm is more a lengthy essay than a book. It 
was, according to Peter Winch's "Preface," Malcolm's last complete piece 
of philosophical work before his death. Winch believes that Malcolm did 
want it published, but that he would have worked on it more before sub-
mitting it. Because of its length, about 94 pages, the publisher requested 
that Winch add commentary in order to bring it to book length. In his 
commentary, Winch has "sharp disagreements" with Malcolm's claims. I 
will not discuss those disagreements in this review. I will say that 
Winch's commentary adds the aspect of an on-going philosophical dia-
logue to the book and that his objections seem carefully made, accurate, 
and strong. Nevertheless, Malcolm's thesis is quite interesting, and I 
would not have him withdraw it for Winch's objections. 
Malcolm, then, has written another book on themes in his teacher's 
work. This one compares Wittgenstein's thinking to the kind of thinking 
that religious people do when actually living and talking in "a religious 
point of view." According to Malcolm, this is meant to be an analogy. It 
is not that Wittgenstein takes up religious themes or discusses religious 
language. Rather, there is something about his thought that reminds 
Malcolm of the way in which religious people think. Malcolm then 
interprets the following remark of Wittgenstein according to his under-
standing and comparison of how religious people think to 
Wittgenstein's phiIosphy. The remark is quoted from a conversation 
with M. O'c. Drury: "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing 
every problem from a religious point of view" (Rush Rhees editor, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Personal Recollections, p. 94). Malcolm's question is: 
What did Wittgenstein mean by this remark? 
A quick glance at the book would seem to indicate that the subject 
matter was Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. After a chapter in 
which Malcolm puts Wittgenstein forward as having said or written cer-
tain things which show that he was in fact thoughtful about religion, the 
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remaining chapters appear to discuss non-religious subject matter such 
as the picture theory of meaning, language-games, essences as meaning, 
and Chomsky's theory of how we generate grammar. But this apparent 
subject matter is really in the service of another hypothesis. That 
hypothesis is complex. It invloves: 1) that Wittgenstein's work on lan-
guage reflects his understanding that philosophical explanations come 
to an end somewhere; and 2) that Wittgenstein thought that religious 
people also looked at their world from this point of view. A religious 
point of view, that is, would be one that, like Wittgenstein's, acknowl-
edged a terminus in its accounts. 
A terminus in a religious point of view might be seen in the follow-
ing. When a tragedy strikes in a religious person's life, he or she might 
be calmed later with the thought that it was God's will. This should be 
regarded as a response or an attitude as opposed to an explanation. A 
religious response to a tragedy is not an hypothesis developed and test-
ed which aims at explaining why such a thing happened. There is, to be 
sure, a question: Why did this happen?, which has the grammatical 
form of the question calling for an explanation. But it is more of an out-
cry than a philosophical question. The conception of a religious 
response involves that a demand for an explanation from God is mean-
ingless or presumptuous. Malcolm writes: "There is a religious attitude 
which would regard as meaningless, or ignorant, or presumptuous, any 
demand for God's reason or justification, or any attempt to explain why 
He willed, or permitted, this disaster to occur" (2). He goes on to relate 
the story of Job as an illustration of this point. Job rejects the logic of his 
accusers who hear the question: "Why did this happen?" as a calling for 
an explanation of the mind of God. By contrast Malcolm claims that the 
story of Job "shows that the notion of there being a reason for His deeds 
has no application to God; nor the notion of there being a justifiCiltion or 
explanation for God's actions" (3). 
It is by way of an analogy to this religious attitude that Malcolm puts 
forward such views of Wittgenstein as language-games and forms of 
life. In the chapter "The Essence of Language," Malcolm reviews 
Wittgenstein's discovery of language-games as a way through the confu-
sions of the Tractatus in which he sought an explanation to meaning. 
The language-game shows that there is no general form of propositions 
as he had supposed in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein later realized that 
propositions are not the only form of language. He also came to under-
stand that propositions do not have a logical essence-a picture-as 
their meaning. The same is true for the meaning of a word. The mean-
ing of a word is not an essence-a mental object. What do all cases of 
the uses of a word have in common? "Don't think but look!" Look at 
the language-games and see what the similarities and differences are. In 
the language-games, one sees all there is to see. There is no further hid-
den essence. "Nothing is hidden." In this sense language-games may 
be seen as what brings the felt need for an explanation to a stop. There 
is no further explanation of the meaning of a word or sentence than the 
language-game in which it is used. 
In the chapter "Failed Explanations," Malcolm provides a half-dozen 
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examples from Wittgenstein's thought of how philosophical explana-
tions fail when they explain what does not need an explanation. In phi-
losophy we are smitten by puzzlements which seem to call for explana-
tions where none is really needed. The resulting explanations are confu-
sions based on confusion. One such example, Malcolm believes, is 
Noam Chomsky's theory that "the mastering of a language is due to the 
innate possession of the grammar of all possible languages" (72). This 
theory is the result of the question: How is it possible that we can learn 
a language? This question arises out of the awe felt in considering the 
fact that babies cannot speak but seven-year-olds can chatter. What 
explains this ability to learn a language? Is it a capacity? -an imprint-
ing and associating of ideas? It is a basic fact that human children do 
learn to speak a language. What further explanation could there be? 
Could learning a language be a kind of miracle? One might explain how 
a child came to know the word 'chair' or "red," but this would not satis-
fy the felt need to erase the awe expressed by the question. Notice that 
any explanation of that would come in a language. The latter is an 
insight into the queerness of the question. 
Another example of failed explanations is the theory of memory, 
based in a materialist conception of mind, which explains "that memory 
and recognition would be magical without the existence of physiological 
memory traces" (72). This theory, of course, is one that Malcolm himself 
spent much effort to expose as confused. Again, the feeling of awe or 
the sense that such a thing would be magic is at the source of the ques-
tion. The felt puzzlement is expressed in the question: How is it possi-
ble for us to remember? But it is simply a remarkable fact about humans 
that we remember. Could memory too be a kind of miracle? We are still 
inclined to ask if there must not be a single physiological event in the 
brain which corresponds to some particular memory-the cause of the 
effect. Otherwise we have magic-a mental event with no cause. In this 
connection, Malcolm quotes one of Wittgenstein's most radical and 
mind-clearing remarks: "Why shouldn't there be a psychological regu-
larity to which no physiological regularity corresponds? If this over-
throws our conceptions of causality, then it is time they were over-
thrown" (Zettel #610). Here Wittgenstein shows no respect for what he 
regards as the tyranny of science. Malcolm's point is that such a lack of 
respect comes from seeing everything from what Wittgenstein calls "a 
religious point of view." 
A religious point of view, whatever else it is, is one that sees the hand 
of God in everyday life. Kierkegaard describes the knight of faith as one 
who believes that God is concerned with the details of life. The philoso-
pher's god, by contrast, is a nameless abstraction. The God of Abraham 
has a covenant with Abraham and his children. How is this thinkable? 
How is it possible that from a religious point of view one sees the pres-
ence of the eternal in the finite? A religious point of view is not a philo-
sophical explanation to this puzzle. However, a religious point of view, 
if apprehended philosophically, acknowledges and preserves this para-
dox-the presence of God in everyday life. It is only from a religious 
point of view that a miracle can be seen. Seeing a miracle is seeing the 
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hand of God in the ordinary. A secular point of view sees the ordinary 
as explanable soley in terms of science. It is Wittgenstein's critical atti-
tude toward science of the sort reflected in the remark about memory 
traces which makes him the natural ally of the religious point of view. 
Malcolm's book grasps this attitude by focusing on the concept of the 
terminus of explanations and the failure of explanations which excede 
the terminus. 
In 1949, Wittgenstein, at Malcolm's invitation, taught a seminar and 
led discussions at Cornell. Malcolm also had invited his undergraduate 
teacher O.K. Bouwsma to Cornell that summer. Bouwsma walked and 
talked with Wittgenstein then and over the next two years. Upon show-
ing his diary of those talks to Malcolm, Malcolm wrote the following in 
response to a story about Wittgenstein's surprise at an iron mesh bridge 
they had crossed: "I like ... his striking comment that in order to under-
stand the Mormons a certain obtuseness is required-like needing big 
shoes to cross a bridge with cracks in it! This latter seems to me a most 
penetrating image." Malcolm saw in this story the same idea of termi-
nus and paradox. The combination of the iron mesh and the big shoes is 
the terminus for Malcolm. It is possible to cross the bridge if one ignores 
the holes. The Mormon's faith, like all religious faith, requires a certain 
obtuseness in order not to ask questions calling for an explanation for 
the presence of God in the ordinary. 
I am willing to ignore in this book whatever Malcolm wrote of 
Wittgenstein that is simplified or overly direct or even mistaken in order 
to have him present this comparison of elements of Wittgenstein's work 
to a religious point of view. There could be other interesting interpreta-
tions of Wittgenstein's remark. Malcolm's interpretation, however, is 
penetrating in the same way he thought Wittgenstein's remark about the 
bridge penetrating. I, for one, am appreciative of the stimulus he has 
provided those of us captivated by Wittgenstein's philosophical work. 
